Representations, targets, and attitudes
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Tác giả: Robert Cummins, ,

Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở

ISBN:  026203235X

Ký hiệu phân loại: 128.2 Mind

Thông tin xuất bản: Cambridge, Mass. :MIT Press, 1996.,

Mô tả vật lý: 1 online resource (153 pages) : , illustrations.

Ngôn ngữ:

What is it for something in the mind to represent something? Robert Cummins looks at the familiar problems of representation theory (what information is represented in the mind, what form mental representation takes, how representational schemes are implemented in the brain, what it is for one thing to represent another) from an unprecedented angle. Instead of following the usual procedure of defending a version of "indicator" semantics, Cummins begins with a theory of representational error and uses this theory to constrain the account of representational content. Thus, the problem of misrepresentation, which plagues all other accounts, is avoided at the start. Cummins shows that representational error can be accommodated only if the content of a representation is intrinsic - independent of its use and causal role in the system that employs it.

Mental representation.-- Representation (Philosophy)-

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